Wednesday, November 09, 2005

France to deport foreign rioters

Interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy has ordered the expulsion of all foreigners convicted of taking part in the riots that have swept France for 13 nights.

He told parliament 120 foreigners had been found guilty of involvement and would be deported without delay.

Police said overnight violence had fallen significantly - although trouble still flared in more than 100 towns.

The government has declared a state of emergency in Paris and more than 30 other areas to help quell the unrest.

The northern city of Amiens was the first to impose an overnight curfew under the new powers, which came into force at midnight.

The western towns of Rouen, Le Havre and Evreux and the French Riviera region have also said they will implement the measures.

However the Seine-Saint-Denis region north-east of Paris, where the trouble started almost two weeks ago, said it would not impose a curfew after violence diminished for a third night running.

Mr Sarkozy told MPs that non-French nationals - "not all of whom are here illegally" - had been convicted of taking part in the attacks.

"I have asked the prefects to deport them from our national territory without delay, including those who have a residency visa," he said.

Petrol bomb

Senior interior ministry official Claude Gueant said police had seen "a very significant drop" in the intensity of the unrest.

The number of cars set alight across France overnight Tuesday to Wednesday fell to 617, hundreds fewer than the night before.

Some 280 people were arrested and disturbances broke out in 116 areas, half the number affected the preceding night.

However, the authorities in Lyon said public transport would not run after 1800 GMT on Wednesday following a petrol bomb attack on Tuesday.

The areas covered by the emergency powers extend from the English Channel to the Mediterranean, including Paris suburbs and major cities such as Lille, Marseille and Toulouse.

The powers, which can be extended by parliament after 12 days, allow a state of emergency to be declared in defined areas, restricting the movement of people and vehicles.

Police are entitled to carry out house searches and ban public meetings.

Minors are subject to the law between 2200 and 0600 (2100 and 0500 GMT) unless accompanied by an adult, and are also banned from buying petrol.

Nearly three out of four French people support the powers, according to a poll published in the daily Le Parisien newspaper.

But some opposition parties, and the French magistrates association, have described them as a danger to civil liberties.

The far-right French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen told the BBC that rioters should have their French citizenship revoked.

The nightly protests have gripped deprived areas where unemployment is rife and residents complain of racism and discrimination.

The unrest was first sparked by the deaths in the run-down Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois of two youths, who were accidentally electrocuted at an electricity sub-station.

The emergency powers handed to local authorities have been invoked under a 1955 law. This is the first time they have been implemented in mainland France.

Sunday, October 30, 2005

Iran Oil Bourse and the US $

Iran has announced that, starting March 2006, it will open a bourse (exchange) for selling oil in Euros.

Oil is the most traded commodity in the world, and is pre-dominantly sold through exchanges in New York and London, both of which are US owned (NYMEX and IPE). This ensures that oil is priced in US $. 70% of the world's currency reserves are held in US $.

Iran is the world's second largest producer of oil. If the Iran Oil Bourse (OIB) were to be launched successfully, it would reduce the need for countries to hold their existing levels of US $ and increase the demand for Euro's.

Labeled part of the 'Axis of Evil' by the US, Iran's proposed move seems to serve two strategic purposes: Europe is its largest trading partner, so giving the euro a foothold in the international oil trade makes sense.

It also allows Iran to strike back at the US economically, by reducing the US $ role as a reserve currency. Loss of reserve currency status would lead to a sharp rise in US interest rates and cause a potential recession.

The last country to convert from selling oil in US $ to Euros was Iraq in 2000. The whole WMD issue on Iraq seems to correlate with the enormous pressure being put on Iran on its nuclear development program. While the OIB is unlikely to come to fruition, it is interesting to see how much Iran and China have the ability to destabilise the US $.

A vote by member nations (US, Britain, France, Germany, etc.) at the International Atomic Energy Agency brought pressure on the IAEA to bring Iran in front of the UN Security Council for non-compliance under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

India, which sided with the European powers in voting to chastise Iran, was accused of hypocrisy, as it has nuclear weapons and is not a signatory to the NPT.

Monday, October 17, 2005

THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION

A Referendum for Disaster

by Phyllis Bennis

** The constitutional process culminating in Saturday's referendum is not a sign of Iraqi sovereignty and democracy taking hold, but rather a consolidation of U.S. influence and control. Whether Iraq's draft constitution is approved or rejected, the decision is likely to make the current situation worse.

** The ratification process reflects U.S., not Iraqi urgency, and is resulting in a vote in which most Iraqis have not even seen the draft, and amendments are being reopened and negotiated by political parties and elites in Baghdad as late as four days before the planned referendum.

** The proposed constitution would strip Iraqis of future control over their nation's oil wealth by opening all new oil exploration and production to foreign oil companies.

** The imposition of federalism as defined in the draft constitution undermines Iraqi national consciousness and sets the stage for a potential division of Iraq largely along ethnic and religious lines, with financial, military, and political power devolving from the central government to the regional authorities. All groups risk sectoral as well as national interests.

** Human rights, including women's rights, individual political and civil rights, economic and social rights, religious rights, minority rights, all remain at risk.

** Instead of balancing the interests of Iraq's diverse population by referencing its long- dominant secular approaches, the draft constitution reflects, privileges and makes permanent the current occupation-fueled turn towards Islamic identity.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Constitutions can play a crucial role in founding and unifying new or renewing states; Iraq is no exception, and in the future drafting a constitution could play a key part in reunifying and strengthening national consciousness of the country. But this process has been imposed from outside, it is not an indigenous Iraqi process, and the draft constitution being debated is not a legitimate Iraqi product. Iraqis are still suffering under conditions of severe deprivation, violence, lack of basic necessities including clean water, electricity, jobs -- crafting a new constitution does not appear high on their agenda.

The existing process of ratifying the new constitution is far more important to the Bush administration than it is to the majority of people of Iraq. Whether the proposed constitution is approved or rejected on Saturday, it is a process and a text largely crafted and imposed by U.S. occupation authorities and their Iraqi dependents, and thus lacking in legal or political legitimacy. The most important reality is that the draft does not even mention the U.S. occupation, and neither ratification nor rejection of it will result in moving towards an end to occupation. None of the broad human rights asserted in the draft include any call to abrogate the existing laws first imposed by Paul Bremer, the U.S. pro-consul, and still in effect.

Whether it is accepted or rejected, it is likely to worsen the insecurity and violence facing Iraqis living under the U.S. occupation, and to increase the likelihood of a serious division of the country. If it passes, over significant Sunni (and other) opposition, the constitution will be viewed as an attack on Sunni and secular interests and will institutionalize powerful regional economic and military control at the expense of a weakened central government. Its extreme federalism could transform the current violent political conflict into full-blown civil war between ethnic and religious communities. If it fails, because Sunnis backed by significant secular forces, are able to mobilize enough "no" votes, the result could be a collapse of the current assembly's already weak legitimacy and capacity, and cancellation of the planned December elections. In either event, it is likely that resistance attacks will increase, not decrease. And certainly the greater violence of the U.S. military occupation will continue.

From the vantage point of the Bush administration, a "yes" vote, however slim the margin and however dubious the legitimacy, validates the claim that the occupation is setting the stage for "democratization" in Iraq; this explains the huge investment of money, political clout, and the personal involvement/interference of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in the drafting process. If the White House was looking for a fig leaf to cover troop withdrawals, this would be it. But there is no indication there is any such interest in beginning to bring the troops home, particularly since the referendum is unlikely to lead to any diminution of violence.

From the vantage point of the peace movement, the key issue, like that during the elections, remains that of Iraq's sovereignty and self-determination. Whatever we may think of this draft constitution, it has been essentially imposed on the Iraqi people by U.S. occupation authorities, and as such it is not legitimate. We may like parts of this draft, we may disagree with some future Iraqi-led constitutional process -- but our obligation must be to call for Iraqis to control their own country and their own destiny. Once the U.S. occupation is over, and Iraqis reclaim their own nation, we will continue to build the kind of internationalist ties with women's, labor and other civil society organizations fighting for human rights in Iraq, as we have with partners in so many other countries. But while the U.S. occupation is in control, our first obligation is to work to end it.

THE REFERENDUM ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Saturday's referendum marks a key stage in the process of implementing the U.S.-designed, U.S.-imposed political process designed to give a "sovereign" gloss the continuing U.S. occupation. The process was set in place and pushed to completion by each successive U.S.-backed occupation authority in Iraq. Initial U.S. reluctance to hold early elections was overcome by pressure from Shia leader Ayatollah al-Sistani; while his support insured widespread Shia backing for the political process, it also guaranteed even greater opposition from Sunni and some secular forces.

The Bush administration has invested a huge amount of political capital in insuring the "success" of the constitution process, sacrificing for the actual content of the draft document to insure that something, almost anything, that could be called a constitution will be endorsed by a majority of Iraqis. The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, has played an active and coercive role in pushing Iraqi political forces to participate and make concessions, and in the actual drafting of the document. The U.S. goal is to justify the claim that Iraq is "moving towards democracy" and that the post-invasion, occupied reality of Iraq in 2005 is somehow equivalent to the experience of the United States at the time of the drafting of the U.S. constitution. While numerous politicians, pundits and mainstream journalists routinely refer to the constitution's approval as the "necessary step towards ending the U.S. occupation once and for all," it actually does nothing of the sort. Despite asserting the rhetorical claim of "sovereignty" and "independence" for Iraq, the constitution as drafted makes no mention of the U.S. occupation. Even the "transition" section, while insuring the continuation of the "de-Baathification" process, support for former political prisoners and victims of terrorist attacks, and other contemporary concerns, there is no mention of the presence of the 150,000 or so U.S. and coalition troops occupying the country, and certainly no call for them to go home. The U.S.-controlled political process violates the Geneva Convention's prohibitions on an occupying power imposing political or economic changes on the occupied country. At the end of the day, the constitution leaves the U.S. occupation intact and unchallenged.

THE VOTING PROCESS

There has been large-scale opposition to the draft constitution, particular from key elements of the Sunni population. In a U.S.-prodded effort to "get the Sunnis on board," changes were negotiated between one Sunni party and the constitutional committee. Just three days before the vote, on October 12, they agreed to two changes -- allowing the constitution to be amended by the new parliament scheduled to be elected in December, and limiting the "deBaathification" process to those former members of the Baath party accused of committing crimes. The announcement may persuade some additional Sunnis to vote, rather than boycott, or even to support rather than reject the constitution. But the Iraq Islamic Party is only one, and by far not the most influential, of the many Sunni-dominated political forces in Iraq, and it is unclear how influential they are or how significant the changes will be.

LIKELY RESULTS

If the voting resembles something close to an accurate referendum ("free" and "fair" are not even possibilities, given the dominance of U.S. control of the drafting and conducting a vote under military occupation) the current draft constitution is likely, though not certain, to be approved by a small majority of Iraqi voters. It remains unclear, even with the new changes, whether the majority of the Sunni population will participate and likely vote "no" on the draft, or will boycott the referendum altogether. It also is uncertain how many secular Iraqis of all religions and ethnicities may reject the constitution. There are clear indications that most Iraqis believe the constitution has been drafted in a process from which they are largely excluded; international news outlets report that most had still not seen the text only days before the referendum.

CONTROL OF IRAQI OIL

The major debates between Iraq's ethnic and religious communities, as well as between secular and Islamic approaches, sidelined any debate over crucial economic, especially oil, policy decisions in the constitution. The draft asserts that "Oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces," and that the federal government will administer the oil and gas from "current fields" with the revenues to be "distributed fairly in a matter compatible with the demographic distribution all over the country." But that guarantee refers only to oil fields already in use, leaving future exploitation of almost 2/3 of Iraq's known reserves (17 of 80 known fields, 40 billion of its 115 billion barrels of known reserves), for foreign companies -- because the next section of the constitution demands "the most modern techniques of market principles and encouraging investment." Further, Article 11 states explicitly that "All that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions." That means that future exploration and exploitation of Iraq's oil wealth will remain under the control of the regional authorities where the oil lies -- the Kurdish-controlled North and the Shia-dominated South, insuring a future of impoverishment for the Sunni, secular and inter-mixed populations of Baghdad and Iraq's center, and sets the stage for a future of ethnic and religious strife.

While the specifics of oil privatization are not written into the text of the draft constitution, they are consistent with the proposed Iraqi laws announced in August 2004 by the U.S.-appointed interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. He called for private companies, including foreign oil corporations, to have exclusive rights to develop new oil fields, rather than the Iraqi National Oil Company, as well as at least partial privatization of the INOC itself, thus essentially selling off Iraq's national treasure to the highest foreign corporate bidder.

FEDERALISM

The division of Iraq into three major ethnically- or religiously-defined regions or cantons remains a long-standing fear of many Iraqis and many people and governments across the region and around the world, and the most important basis for opposition to the draft constitution. In historically secular Iraq, the shift in primary identity from "Iraqi" to "Sunni" or "Shia" (although Iraqi Kurdish identity was always stronger) happened largely in response to the U.S. invasion and occupation; it does not reflect historical cultural realities. The draft constitution promotes not just federalism as a national governing structure, but an extreme version of federalism in which all power not specifically assigned to the central government devolves automatically to the regional authorities -- setting the stage for a potential division of Iraq largely along ethnic and religious lines. The draft anticipates a weak national government, with financial, military, and political power all concentrated within regional authorities. The proposed constitution states directly that all powers -- military, economic, political or anything else -- "except in what is listed as exclusive powers of the federal authorities" are automatically reserved for the regional or provincial governments. In all those areas of regional power, the provincial governments are authorized to "amend the implementation of the federal law in the region" meaning they can ignore or override any constitutional guarantee other than foreign affairs or defense of the borders.

Besides the economic/oil conflict, this means that regional (read: religious and/or ethnic) militias accountable to political parties and/or religious leaders will be given the imprimatur of national forces. The process has already undermined Iraqi national consciousness, and sets in place risks for both national and, ironically, sectoral interests affecting each of the groups -- even the most powerful.

Shia

Iraq's Shia majority (about 60%) are the dominant force in the existing government and security agencies, and in alliance with the Kurds, dominate the constitutional drafting process. The constitution is widely understood to favor their interests, and by instituting a semblance of majority rule and according to some sources by privileging religious power within the government and court systems, it does so. But despite recent turns towards religion, many Shia remain very secular, and not all Shia want to institutionalize religious control in either regional or national governments. The federalism provisions, including the potential to establish a Shia-dominated "super-region" in the nine oil-rich provinces of the south, is also a favorite among many Shia. However, the extreme federalism has the parallel effect of largely constraining Shia control to the southern areas (however oil-rich) where they form the largest majority population, thus limiting Shia influence in the country overall. Many Shia live in Baghdad (actually the largest Shia city in Iraq) and other mixed areas outside the southern Shia-majority region. The revered Shia leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has spoken strongly against dividing Iraq, but the constitution sets the groundwork for exactly that.

Sunni

Iraq's Sunni population is dominant in small areas in central Iraq including Baghdad and its environs. With the constitution's strong focus on building regional economic, political and military power, the Sunnis as a community stand to lose the most. With major economic power -- read: control of oil income -- resting with the regional governments, the Sunnis will suffer because the area they dominate in central Iraq is devoid of oil resources. (See "Control of Iraqi Oil" above.) Following the large-scale Sunni boycott of the June 2005 election, they are underrepresented in the national assembly, and have faced the largest proportion of exclusion from jobs, the military, and the government under the "deBaathification" process. Last-minute changes to the draft constitution, including limits on deBaathification may pacify some Sunni anger, but is unlikely to result in full-scale proportional involvement and empowerment in the post-referendum political processes.

Kurds

Iraq's Kurdish population, about 20%, is largely (though not entirely) concentrated in the northern provinces. They have the longest history of a separate ethnic/religious identity of any of Iraq's major groups, and their search for independence or autonomy has long roots, strengthened by years of oppression by various central governments in Baghdad. Iraq's Kurdish leaders are the closest allies of the U.S. in Iraq, having provided support to the invasion and occupation even before the U.S. military attacks began. Because of U.S. protection during the 12 post-Desert Storm sanctions years, the Kurdish region also had access to more money (through an intentional distortion of the oil-for-food distribution of Iraq's oil funds), international ties through open borders to Turkey and beyond, and the development of U.S.- and other western-backed civil society institutions than any other sector of Iraq. They are by far the best prepared and the most eager for control of regional oil income (their zone includes rich northern oil fields, especially if they end up incorporating the once-Kurdish but now overwhelmingly mixed area around Kirkuk) and a weakened central government. Their regional militia, the pesh merga, are also by far the most powerful of any Iraqi military force. Some Kurdish forces, however, are already critical of the draft constitution because their oil-rich three-province region would be dwarfed by the even more oil-rich Shia-dominated nine-province region in the south.

Secular forces

Along with Palestine, Iraq was historically the most secular of all Arab countries. The draft constitution, while vague in many details, certainly lays the groundwork for a far greater role for religious authorities in governmental and judicial institutions. Many secular Iraqis, as well as Christians, are dismayed by the privileging of Muslim clerics within the constitutional court, for example, as well as the regional empowerment that allows local/regional governments to choose sharia, or Islamic law, as the basis for some or all of its court jurisdiction rather than secular laws.

RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Officially the draft constitution includes far-reaching protections of human rights, including a wide range of political and civil rights, and explicitly women's rights, saying that says Iraq will "respect the rule of law, reject the policy of aggression, pay attention to women and their rights, the elderly and their cares, the children and their affairs, spread the culture of diversity and defuse terrorism." Economic, social and cultural rights are explicitly protected in language far stronger than that of the U.S. constitution and Bill of Rights, or that of most other countries. But there is contradictory language as well. The draft states that "(a) No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam. (b) No law can be passed that contradicts the principles of democracy. (c) No law can be passed that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms outlined in this constitution."

Whether basic freedoms will trump Islam or vice versa, and crucially, who will decide, seems a dangerous risk. Ultimately, instead of balancing the interests of Iraq's diverse Muslim majority with its once-dominant secular, the draft constitution reflects, privileges and makes permanent Iraq's current occupation-fueled turn towards Islamic identity.

Phyllis Bennis, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, is the author of the forthcoming Challenging Empire: How People, Governments, and the UN Defy U.S. Power (Interlink Publishing, Northampton MA, October 2005).

Sunday, October 16, 2005

Waiting for justice in Iran


In July 1988, during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian village of Zardeh was hit by Iraqi chemical bombs. The BBC's Frances Harrison returns to the village to see how local people are coping with the legacy.

It was a smell like rotten herbs they say, the odour of a new form of death.

Early that morning, in July 1988, the people of Zardeh were gathered in the local shrine.

First they heard the planes flying overhead, nothing out of the ordinary for a village nestling in the side of a dusty dry mountain dividing Iran from Iraq.

Today everyone mentions how small the sound of the explosions was, oddly disproportionate with the calamity they unleashed.

Each plane dropped four bombs, weighing 250kg each. The smoke was yellow, green, red, black. One man said it was like a rainbow, another said it was as if the sky was covered in plastic clingfilm.

The birds started dropping out of the trees and then the people fell.

Two hundred and seventy five died that morning in a place of worship - many of them women and children.

Some of those who survived now believe it would have been better to have perished instantly.

Like 19-year-old Hedieh. Her name means "a gift", but now she is a terrible burden to her family.

She has to spend four hours a day attached to an oxygen cylinder. It is expensive and needs refilling every week in the nearest town, three hours drive away.

Hedieh would like to go to university, but that is out of the question.

The most she can do is help her mother shell the walnuts which are now in season. "I am waiting to die," she says.

"Every day I get steadily worse and the doctors cannot do anything."

Her eyesight, her skin, her breathing have all been affected.

She says she has absolutely no hope for the future. I ask her if there is anything anyone can do if they want to help her and she shakes her head and cries.

"Whoever did this to me should have the same thing done back to them so they understand," she says.

Chemical burns

Others have more energy for anger.

Gulpari says she wants to kebab Saddam Hussein like he kebabed her sister.

It sounds brutal but that is actually how Gulbanoo's face now looks.

She is horribly disfigured, the burned skin stretched over her nose and her mouth all chapped.

Gulbanoo holds up a black and white passport photo from before the bombing.

"Look," she says," Saddam is the main reason why my husband left me and my six kids, because I am no longer beautiful."

Gulbanoo was at the shrine that morning and rushed to the nearest stream to wash off the chemicals.

As she drank and splashed the water over her face the last thing Gulbanoo remembers is that the water was hot.

Little did she know that one of the chemical bombs had landed on the reservoir contaminating the main water supply for the village.

By washing she only injured herself more. Gulbanoo woke up in hospital to learn that five of her brothers and her father had been killed in the attack.

Health effects

Visiting the shrine, I found myself mobbed by survivors, desperate to tell their story.

Old women in traditional Kurdish dress lifting up their skirts or opening their blouses to show me scars and terrible burns all over their bodies.

"Everyone knows the story of Halabja," they said, "but what about our village, for God's sake do not forget us."

And yet forgotten is what they are.

I was told I was the first journalist, Iranian or foreign to visit Zardeh after the initial aftermath of the bombing.

It took nine years before local doctors realised almost the entire population of this village was suffering from the long-term effects of exposure to mustard gas and nerve agent.

And that means 1,500 people ill in a population of 1,700, 70 cases of cancer and a 30% miscarriage rate.

Nobody even knows the environmental damage caused or what the consequences will be for future generations. This was, after all, the first war in which nerve agent was used.

'Blind eye'

So why is Saddam Hussein not being tried for what he did to villages like Zardeh?

Iran has documented 30 such attacks on its soil, some of them using as many as 300 chemical bombs.

Iranians say it is a clear case of discrimination that Saddam Hussein has been charged for war crimes in Halabja, but not what he did just across the border in Iran.

They believe Western governments turned a blind eye to companies supplying Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons.

After all in those days Saddam was an ally against an Iran which had taken American diplomats hostage.

Eighteen years later the people of Zardeh are still waiting for the record to be put straight and until it is, they say the trial of Saddam Hussein will not be a fair one.

US troops 'starve Iraqi citizens'

A senior United Nations official has accused US-led coalition troops of depriving Iraqi civilians of food and water in breach of humanitarian law.

Human rights investigator Jean Ziegler said they had driven people out of insurgent strongholds that were about to be attacked by cutting supplies.

Mr Ziegler, a Swiss-born sociologist, said such tactics were in breach of international law.

A US military spokesman in Baghdad denied the allegations.

"A drama is taking place in total silence in Iraq, where the coalition's occupying forces are using hunger and deprivation of water as a weapon of war against the civilian population," Mr Ziegler told a press conference in Geneva.

He said coalition forces were using "starvation of civilians as a method of warfare."

"This is a flagrant violation of international law," he added.

'False allegations'

Mr Ziegler said he understood the "military rationale" when confronting insurgents who do not respect "any law of war".

But he insisted that civilians who could not leave besieged cities and towns for whatever reason should not suffer as a result of this strategy.

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Boylan, a US military spokesman, later rejected the accusations.

"Any allegations of us withholding basic needs from the Iraqi people are false," he said.

Even though some supplies had been delayed during fighting, he argued that "all precautions" were being taken to take care of civilians.

"It does not do relief supplies any good if you have them going into a firefight," he said.

The Geneva Conventions forbid depriving civilians of food and water.

Cutting off food supply lines and destroying food stocks is also forbidden.

Mr Ziegler, who opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq, said he would urge the UN General Assembly to condemn this practice when he presented his yearly report on 27 October.

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Iraqi MPs approve charter changes

Iraq's parliament has approved last-minute changes to the draft constitution aimed at overcoming Sunni Arab objections.

No vote was taken on the amendments agreed by representatives of the communities on Tuesday night.

One Sunni party has said it will vote for the draft if MPs elected in the December elections can review it. Other Sunnis maintain their boycott.

On Saturday, Iraqis go to the polls to vote on the new constitution.

No objection

Parliament met to discuss the changes agreed by Sunni, Shia and Kurdish leaders during the three-day talks.

The proposed changes were read out by Humam Hamoudi, chairman of the committee charged with drafting the constitution.

"Since there was no objection after the reading of the modifications, we can consider it approved," he said.

Among the key additions to the 139-article draft constitution are:

* Article 1 that reads: "This constitution is a guarantee for the unity of Iraq."

* Article 4 that reads: "The federal and official organisations in the Kurdistan region use the Arabic language and the Kurdish language as the official languages."

* Article 131 that reads: "Just being a member of the Baath Party is not grounds for prosecution and any [former] member is treated equally before the law and has all protections of the law."

Shia officials said earlier it had been agreed to add four articles to the constitution.

One of those amendments would allow a committee to be established at the end of the year to carry out a comprehensive review of the constitution.

"There is no excuse for Arab Sunnis to boycott the vote now that we have responded to all their demands and suggestions," Iraqi President Jalal Talabani said at a televised news conference after Tuesday's talks.

Divided opinion

Sunni leaders fear the current proposals would lead the country to split into a Kurdish north and Shia south, depriving the Sunnis of access to the country's oil resources.

Earlier, one of the main Sunni parties, Iraqi Islamic party, said Tuesday's agreement meant they could call on their supporters to back the constitution.

But other Sunnis maintained their call for a boycott.

If voters in just three of Iraq's 18 provinces muster a two-thirds majority against the constitution, it will fail.

The Sunnis are dominant in four provinces and so therefore effectively hold a power of veto if they vote together.

However, correspondents say it will be difficult to attain such a vote and it is likely the constitution will be approved.

Thursday, October 06, 2005

Morocco says border guards kill 6 African migrants

By Lamine Ghanmi and Emma Ross-Thomas

RABAT/MELILLA (Reuters) - Moroccan troops, attempting to prevent illegal immigrants from reaching a Spanish enclave, killed six Africans in clashes in northern Morocco on Wednesday night, a local government official said on Thursday.

Spanish police said earlier a joint operation between Spanish and Moroccan police and troops had repelled more than 500 migrants trying to cross into Spain's North African outpost of Melilla before dawn.

Just one man had entered the enclave in the latest mass storming of Europe's southernmost border, they said.

"The assault of rare violence has forced security forces to respond in self-defence. Some 290 migrants were arrested and six among the assailants were dead," Nador province governor Abdellah Bendhiba said in a statement carried by state news agency MAP.

Bendhiba said 400 migrants stormed troop surveillance posts in Gourougou forest in the north of the country in the night between Wednesday and Thursday.

Gourougou forest, where hundreds of migrants often hide before trying to reach Spain's Ceuta and Melilla enclaves in Morocco, lies on the outskirts of Nador, about 500 km (300 miles) north of Rabat.

Spanish human rights group Asociacion Pro-Derechos Humanos said there had been more deaths than Morocco said and hundreds had been injured.

"There are not six, there are quite a few more," Secretary Jose Alonso told Reuters, citing Moroccan medical sources.

SPANISH POLICE CLEARED

The news came after Spanish Interior Minister Jose Antonio Alonso told a parliamentary committe that Spanish police had not been to blame for the deaths of five migrants trying to enter Spain's other outpost Ceuta in a 600-strong group last week.

"It can be confirmed that Civil Guard (police) forces ... did not fire any live rounds with any of the weapons they were equipped with," said Alonso, quoting from a police report.

"They could not have caused the firearms wounds on the bodies found at the site," the report added.

Two bodies were found on the Spanish side of the fence with bullet wounds, Spanish officials said. Three more bodies were found on the Moroccan side and they were also shot, according to news reports.

Alonso limited his testimony to exonerating Spanish police and did not blame anyone for last week's deaths.

He said Spanish authorities investigated the two deaths on the Spanish side of the border while Moroccan authorities were probing the deaths on their side.

Alonso also said that Spain would send 70 African migrants who had entered via Morocco back to its neighbour as part of the reactivation of a deal signed with Morocco in 1992 but hardly ever used.

The move is a radical change in policy. In recent years, African migrants from countries with which Spain does not have repatriation agreements have simply been set free in Spain with an expulsion order which cannot be enforced.

In recent weeks, hundreds of poor Africans desperate to reach wealthy Europe have staged mass assaults on the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, using home-made ladders.

Spain and Morocco have responded by reinforcing their security forces on both sides of the border.

Migrants who entered Melilla in recent days were horrified by the prospect they could be sent back to Morocco.

"There are people who have been on the road five years. They have left their villages, they have nothing," 20-year-old Malian Tiefing Keta said. "If the government does that, what are we going to do?"

174 FM radio stations broadcast in 18 Arab countries

October 2005

Not unlike the Sat TV boom, the Arab World is undergoing an FM radio station boom. The FM radio industry, which is local and not pan-Arab by definition, still has some regionally focused operators. The landscape is made up of local FM stations for the most part and the numbers are projected to sky rocket as more countries allow private FM radio operations in the coming few years. UAE and Algeria have the most crowded state-owned FM radio environment in the region. The UAE leads with 19 radio stations operating under five networks. Algeria follows UAE with 17 radio stations operating under the states Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA) network. On the privately owned stations, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq lead the region with 23, 17 and 10 operational private FM radio stations respectively.

In the recent past in the region, radio and TV were considered political tools of the state with government excreting total control on them. Increasingly, however, liberalization of radio and television is found in countries in the region, which encouraged many new entrants and additional involvement in the industry's offerings. The boom in TV and radio was inevitable. In parallel to the SAT TV boom, radio stations adopted more variety towards the content distributed. Entertainment, music, cultural programs are examples of such adoption.

A new report, "FM Radio in the Arab World 2005" was released to the Arab Advisors Group's Media Strategic Research Service subscribers on September 25, 2005. This report can be purchased from the Arab Advisors Group for only US$ 950. The 59-pages report, which has 32 detailed exhibits, provides a detailed analysis of the FM Radio regulations and landscape in the 18 Arab countries of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. The report includes analysis and profiles of every FM radio (private and government owned) in the region.

"Radio listening is popular and widespread in the Arab World. Arab Advisors surveys in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia reveal that a majority of people listen to radio stations." Ms. Lina Juma, Arab Advisors research analyst wrote in the report.

Egypt and Tunisia were of the first countries in the Middle East to allow private radio stations under a legal framework. Egypt launched Nile FM and Negoom FM in July 2003 then followed by Tunisia's Mosaique FM in November. Furthermore, Jordan's broadcasting media experienced partial liberalization in mid 2003 after the establishment of the audiovisual media law. Finally, the Ministry of information in Kuwait issued a legislation granting licenses to private radio and Television stations in the same year.

Consistent with the liberalization trend, in year 2004 Oman was next in line to offer licenses to private TV and radio stations. Up to date, Syria was the last country to pursue liberalization. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is presently planning to privatize some public radio stations.


About Arab Advisors Group
Arab Advisors Group provides reliable research, analysis and forecasts of Arab communications, media and technology markets.

Arab Advisors Group Strategic Research Services (Media and Telecoms) are annual subscriptions. The services cover eighteen countries in the Arab World: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. For more information, please contact the Arab Advisors Group offices. www.arabadvisors.com

For more information, please contact:
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Dana Khatib
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© Press Release 2005

Neighbours fear Iraqi Shia power

By Roger Hardy

In the run-up to the referendum on Iraq's new constitution, there are growing anxieties among the country's neighbours.

Is Iraq on the verge of break-up? Has it swung firmly into the orbit of Shia Iran? Will the violence in Iraq spill over into other countries?

Iran's new foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, is on a mission of reassurance.

He has been telling his counterparts on the Arab side of the Gulf that they have no reason to fear Iran's intentions - or its new, more conservative government.

At the heart of his message is that Iran, like the Arabs, wants to see a stable Iraq, free of foreign interference.

Disintegration

But the Arab states, and for that matter Turkey, are not reassured.

They feel that the main beneficiary of the toppling of Saddam Hussein, and the rise of a Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, is Iran.

The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, was recently in Washington warning darkly that violence and sectarianism in Iraq could lead to its disintegration.

He then delivered the same stark message to a meeting of Arab ministers - and was roundly rebuffed by Iraq's interior minister, Bayan Jabr.

Mr Jabr, a Shia with close connections to Iran, denounced the Saudi kingdom's treatment of its women and its Shia minority.

And for good measure he called the Saudi prince a "bedouin on a camel".

'Sunni order' challenged

Such verbal exchanges between Middle East neighbours are not, of course, unprecedented.

But behind the insults lurk serious issues.

Most of Iraq's neighbours were unhappy about the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

They had no great love of Saddam Hussein, but were worried about the regional consequences of the war.

In many ways, the fallout has been even worse than they had feared.

The Americans and their allies appear to be bogged down fighting an insurgency which could drag on for years.

While Sunni Arabs in the region have some sympathy for what could be called the nationalist element within the insurgency, they are troubled by the ultra-violent "jihadi" element.

They are afraid that the Arab militants who have entered Iraq to join the insurgency will one day go home to make trouble.

Moreover the Arab world has traditionally been run by a Sunni Arab elite.

The sight of an Arab government dominated by Shia and Kurdish ministers has come as a shock.

Some even see a new threat to the regional "Sunni order".

Iran 'ambiguous'

Such fears may be exaggerated.

The new power of the Iraqi Shia is certainly being watched with close interest by Shia elsewhere in the region.

But, so far, the effect has been to stimulate a kind of cultural renaissance, a heightened sense of Shia consciousness and identity.

Whether this will translate into greater political power - for example, for Saudi Arabia's Shia minority - is an open question.

As for Iran, its intentions in Iraq remain ambiguous.

Since the fall of Saddam, it has strengthened its religious, cultural and economic ties with Iraq's Shia majority.

It has cultivated close relations with all the main Shia political parties and their militias.

Less clear is whether it is actually fomenting anti-American violence, as some US officials have alleged.

Even if it is not, Iraq's neighbours believe that America has wittingly or unwittingly changed the regional balance of power in Iran's favour.

And they believe they, and the Americans, will suffer as a result.

Monday, October 03, 2005

Lebanon could meet its energy needs and generate $3 billion yearly

BEIRUT: Lebanon could meet all of its energy needs and generate revenue of about $3 billion a year if the government proceeds with the appropriate legislation to set the ground for oil and gas companies to come and drill for its hydrocarbon offshore reserves. "Lebanon could have estimated oil or gas reserves of 70,000 and 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) with indirect foreign direct investment revenues estimated at current oil prices of $60 bpd to reach $60 billion in 20 years," said energy and privatization expert Roudi Baroudi, adding that "it won't take more than 10 to 18 months before we start cashing in."

As the world price of crude oil is skyrocketing, companies have excess liquidity and are looking for new ventures to invest in. This makes it imperative for the government to approach international corporations and start the bidding for offshore drilling, said Baroudi, adding that with newly available technology these initiatives are even more likely.

"In the 90s I would have been skeptical about the whole thing in terms of the cost incurred. But today, it takes nothing for a company to come and invest," said Baroudi.

Several studies done by at least three different seismic firms (Geopracla, Spectrum and TGS) covering 11,000 kilometers cut along 120 2D seismic lines, collected useful data showing that Lebanon's shore is petroliferous

"Shell, Occidental, Total Elf Fina, Petrocanada, Amerada Hess, and Reading and Bates are some of the companies that have bought these offshore seismic studies and showed interest in drilling for oil and gas" said Baroudi. He added that there is no way to find out the actual capacity if companies do not start drilling.

According to the energy expert, Lebanon has a few things to do in order to start seeing investment flowing in: first, it needs to prepare the necessary legislative framework, including creating an appropriate public sharing agreement (PSA) system which enables a company to invest in the operation and get an estimated 20 to 25 percent of revenues, while the rest goes to the state. If prospects are revealed to be promising then government royalties can be increased for new comers said Baroudi, adding that "for example a new venture in the Gulf secures up to 95 percent of revenues for the state.

Second, political meddling should be stopped. In 1997, Qatar offered to supply liquefied natural gas in 1997 to Lebanon. Had the government started implementing the project "we would have had gas since 2000 saving approximately $400 million a year in today's price terms. Instead the situation looks grim: "the country has the highest kilowatt energy rate in the region," explained Baroudi.

In 1999, Syria agreed to supply Lebanon with gas should the infrastructure be completed. Again, mismanagement and oil lobbying to block the finalization of the project delayed the construction works of the gas pipeline until 2004. And due to the political turmoil in the beginning of 2005, the Syrian troops' withdrawal was followed by the offer's temporary withdrawal.

"The Syrian PSA is a very favorable one if Lebanon starts executing as its commits Damascus to supply gas at a highest price of $24 bpd which saves us over $40 per bpd," Baroudi said.

Third, marketing effort should be made to divide Lebanon's offshore into blocks available for tender, said Baroudi.

Meanwhile, Lebanon has precedents in the region in terms of offshore drilling.

Egypt started in the beginning of the 1990s and has increased gas production "by almost 50 percent between 1997 and the year 2000" thanks to new field discoveries within the Nile Delta region, said Baroudi

Israel today has three offshore wells, and even Gaza managed to attract British Gas to drill for one as reserves were rumored to be in excess of 300 billion cubic feet.

"The exploration success rate in the offshore Nile Delta of Egypt, for example, is about 85 percent, which is very

positive for offshore Lebanese exploration potential"

said Baroudi.

Also, Lebanon's offshore sea bottom is from the Miocene and Oligocene age, which is the type of soil on which major oil and gas accumulations were found according to Baroudi.

Sunni anger at Iraq vote change

Sunni Arabs have reacted angrily to a decision by Iraq's Shia-dominated parliament making it harder to reject the new constitution in 12 days' time.

The two-thirds majority needed in three provinces to defeat the constitution will now be counted from all registered - as opposed to actual - voters.

Many registered voters may not show up because of violence, it is argued.

Saleh al-Mutlaq, of the Sunni group Iraqi National Dialogue, called the change a "clear forgery".

"They want this constitution to pass despite the will of the people," he added.

BBC Baghdad correspondent Caroline Hawley says violence, intimidation and US military offensives could keep many Sunnis away from polling centres.

'Implausible' change

The interim constitution drawn up under US administrator Paul Bremer in 2003 says the following about the issue:

"The general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it."

But on Sunday, MPs said a No vote from two-thirds of "registered" voters was needed for a veto.

The new interpretation keeps the clause stipulating that only half of actual voters are needed for the text to be adopted.

Many Sunni Arabs oppose the draft constitution on the grounds that its federal provisions could lead to the break-up of Iraq.

In elections for the transitional parliament in January, less than 60% of registered Iraqis voted after Sunni leaders called for a boycott.

'Forceful' response

With growing Sunni-Shia tension ahead of the vote, analysts say the tactical alliance between Shia religious parties and the Kurds looks in danger of unravelling.

Kurdish officials accused Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari - a Shia - of seeking to monopolise power.

They have also said he has failed to deal with the thorny issue of Kirkuk, the oil-rich northern city the Kurds see as their rightful capital.

However, President Jalal Talabani - a Kurd - played down his earlier calls for Mr Jaafari to resign.

"We don't think this is the time to change the government now," Mr Talabani said during a visit to Prague.

Mr Jaafari said that he had heard the president's comments, but did not have the time to respond to them.

"My time is taken up running the executive branch of the government. I will express myself forcefully when the time is right," he added.